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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The district court reasoned the unripe fruit was not being held by
taxpayer for sale in the ordinary course of his business, as his business
was the selling of mature fruit. To the contrary, the Tax Court held
that, although the fruit was sold prior to maturity along with the land,
the form of the transaction does not change the fact that the fruit was
being held by taxpayer for sale in the ordinary course of his business.
It is difficult to see how it can be reasoned that the crops were not
held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business. It is true
taxpayer was in the business of selling mature fruit. But are crops any
less "heldr by him primarily for sale because sold prior to maturity?
Common sense and reason would suggest they are not. The mere form
and time of the transaction should not control." The crops are the only
thing taxpayer is holding for sale in the ordinary course of his busi-
ness. Effecting their sale prior to maturity along with the land should
not change the nature of his holding.
One might argue that the words of the statute do not authorize
allocation of the sale price for purposes of taxation. This is literally
true, as the statute speaks in terms of business property as a unit. How-
ever, when the statute was drafted, it is doubtful whether this situation
was contemplated. Keeping in mind the economic realities of the situ-
ation, it seems a reasonable construction of the statute to require allo-
cation. Generally a farmer deducts the costs of raising his crops as
ordinary business expenses. He should not be allowed to convert his
profit into a capital gain by effecting their sale immediately prior to
maturity along with the land.
MASON P. THOMAS, JR.
Torts-Misrepresentation-Requisite of Scienter
Defendant's agent, admittedly acting within the scope of his employ-
ment, falsely represented to plaintiff that the house which plaintiff was
buying from defendant was constructed of brick veneer. Plaintiff re-
lied on this representation and was thereby induced to make the pur-
chase. The house in fact was built of "speed brick," an inferior type
of construction. At the close of plaintiff's evidence the court granted
a nonsuit on the ground that there was no proof of scienter. Held,
new trial granted. ". . . a false representation positively made by one
who ought in the discharge of his duty to have known the truth and
who is consciously and recklessly ignorant whether it be true or false,
may be regarded as fraudulent when made to induce a sale and reason-
ably relied on by the vendee."'
"' Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U. S. 504 (1948).
1 Atfinson v. Charlotte Builders, Inc., 232 N. C. 67, 68, 59 S. E. 2d 1 (1950).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The long recognized elements of fraud and deceit adopted by the
North Carolina court from a textwriter 2 are: (1) a representation, (2)
untrue in fact, (3) the person making it or the person responsible for
it, knows it to be untrue, or is culpably ignorant (that is, recklessly and
consciously ignorant) whether it be true or not, (4) made with the
intent that it be acted upon, or in a manner fitted to induce action upon
it, (5) plaintiff acts in reliance to his damage.3
As early as 1799, the court recognized that scienter was a necessary
element of fraud and deceit ;4 the defendant must know that he is telling
a falsehood or that he is practicing a concealment. This was modified
somewhat in the case of Hamrick v. Hogg5 where the rule was laid
down that a representation must be false in fact; defendant must be
guilty of a moral falsehood; and the party making the representation
must know or believe it to be false, or what is the same thing, have no
reason to believe it to be true. This modification gelled in Whitehurst
v. Life Ins. Co. of Va.6 into what is modern-day law. It was there said,
".... if a party to a bargain avers the existence of a material fact reck-
lessly, or affirms its existence positively, when he is consciously ignorant
whether it be true or false, he may be held responsible for a falsehood;
and this doctrine is especially applicable when the parties to a bargain
are not upon equal terms with reference to the representation. . .. -7 It
I POLLOcK, TORTS 283 (12th ed. 1923).
'Small v. Dorsett, 223 N. C. 754, 28 S. E. 2d 514 (1943); Ward v. Heath,
222 N. C. 470, 24 S. E. 2d 5 (1943) ; Harding v. Southern Loan & Ins. Co., 218
N. C. 129, 10 S. E. 2d 599 (1940); Whitehurst v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 149 N. C.
273, 62 S. E. 1067 (1908). It is generally considered that the representation must
be of a material fact. The North Carolina court also has held that the repre-
sentation can be a concealment as well as a statement of fact. Isler v. Brown,
196 N. C. 685, 146 S. E. 803 (1929); Cash Register Co. v. Townsend, 137 N. C.
652, 50 S. E. 306 (1905) ; Saunderson v. Ballance, 55 N. C. 322 (1856) ; Brown
v. Gray, 51 N. C. 103 (1858); Gerkins v. Williams, 48 N. C. 11 (1855); Case v.
Edney, 26 N. C. 93 (1843).
"Irwin v. Sherril, 1 N. C. (Taylor) 1 (1799). If bare naked lie the truth
or falsity of which is unknown, no action maintainable; if known falsehood and
loss suffered, action will lie.
12 N. C. 350 (1827).
'Whitehurst v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 149 N. C. 273, 62 S. E. 1067 (1908)
(Agent misrepresented to blind plaintiff that insurance policy provision allowed
plaintiff to collect the total premiums paid plus 4% interest at the end of ten
years.).
"For cases involving this doctrine prior to the Whitehurst case: e.g., Modlin
v. Roanoke R.R. & Nay. Co., 145 N. C. 218, 58 S. E. 1075 (1907) ; Cash Register
Co. v. Townsend, 137 N. C. 652, 50 S. E. 306 (1905); Ramsey v. Wallace, 100
N. C. 75, 6 S. E. 638 (1888); Cobb v. Fogalman, 23 N. C. 440 (1841). Subse-
quent to the Whitehurst case: e.g., Vail v. Vail, 233 N. C. 109, 63 S. E. 2d 202
(1951); Brooks Equipment & Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 230 N. C. 680, 55 S. E. 2d
311 (1949) ; Small v. Dorsett, 223 N. C. 754, 28 S. E. 2d 514 (1943); Harding
v. Southern Loan & Ins. Co., 218 N. C. 129, 10 S. E. 2d 599 (1940); Silver v.
Skidmore, 213 N. C. 231, 195 S. E. 775 (1938) ; Stone v. Doctors' Lake Milling
Co., 192 N. C. 585, 135 S. E. 449 (1926) ; Bell v. Harrison, 179 N. C. 190, 102
S. E. 200 (1920) ; Pate v. Blades, 163 N. C. 267, 79 S. E. 608 (1913) ; Tarault v.
1951]
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can be gathered from this that scienter and its equivalent, reckless
disregard of the truth, are not present where there is innocence. The
party making the misrepresentation must be conscious that it is false, or,
what is in the eyes of the court the same thing, he must be conscious that
he knows neither the truth nor falsity of the misrepresentation.
There are several exceptions to this general requirement of scienter
in an action for fraud and deceit. A director of a corporation has the
duty to know the financial condition of his corporation, and where he
misrepresents such condition he will be held liable for fraud and deceit
without a showing of scienter.8 The president of a corporation is
deemed to have knowledge of an inventory made five days prior to the
misrepresentation.0 Scienter was presumed where the seller who made
the misrepresentation was the inventor ;1O the same presumption is made
where the seller was the manufacturer ;"1 and in a strong dictum the
court said that a vendor or lessor may be held guilty of fraud and deceit
by reason of material, untrue representations in respect to his own busi-
ness or property, the truth of which representation the vendor or lessor
is bound and must be presumed to know.' 2 Where a relationship of
trust and confidence exists between parties, the failure to disclose all
material facts, is a breach of the duty owed and constitutes fraud.'8
In most jurisdictions, if fraud is alleged as the basis for rescission
and at trial only innocent misrepresentations are proved, the court will
nevertheless grant the requested relief.14 North Carolina in Ebbs v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co. adopted a different view: in order to obtain
rescission on the ground of fraud, all the essential elements of fraud
must be proved.15 In other words, whether the relief of damages or the
Seip, 158 N. C. 363, 74 S. E. 3 (1912) ; Hodges v. Smith, 158 N. C. 256, 73 S. E.
807 (1912) ; Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Feezer, 152 N. C. 516, 67 S. E. 1004
(1910).
8 Harper v. Oak Ridge Supply Co., 184 N. C. 204, 144 S. E. 173 (1922);
Houston v. Thornton, 122 N. C. 365, 295 S. E. 827 (1898); Solomon v. Bates,
118 N. C. 311, 24 S. E. 478 (1896); Tate v. Bates, 118 N. C. 287, 24 S. E. 482
(1896).
9 Palomino Mills, Inc. v. Davidson Mills Corp., 230 N. C. 286, 52 S. E. 2d
915 (1949).
11Unitype Company v. Ashcroft Bros., 155 N. C. 63, 71 S. E. 61 (1911)
(type setting machine).
" Peebles v. Patapsco Guano Co., 77 N. C. 233 (1877) (commercial fertilizer).
"See Corley Co. v. Griggs, 192 N. C. 171, 174, 134 S. E. 406, 407 (1926);
citing Lehigh Zinc & Iron Co. v. Bamford, 150 U. S. 665, 673 (1893).
" Vail v. Vail, 233 N. C. 109, 63 S. E. 2d 202 (1951) (Evidence showed a
72 year-old mother to have been induced by son to sign a deed conveying to him
a tract of land other than one agreed upon. On appeal from non-suit the court
held that the fiduciary relationship, added to this evidence, constituted a prima
facie case of fraud.).
14 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS §1500 (Rev. ed. 1937).
199 N. C. 242, 153 S. E. 858 (1930). There was also some indication in
this case that rescission might be granted on a unilateral mistake relying on a
dictum in Long v. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 178 N. C. 503, 101 S. E. 11 (1919).
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relief of rescission is sought on the ground of fraud, the elements of
fraud which must be proved are identical. This includes of course the
necessity of proving scienter in an action for either relief.
Although the court in the principal case chose to ignore Ebbs v. St.
Louis U-nion Trust Co., the two cases are almost identical on their
facts.16  The Ebbs case was an action for rescission and damages on
the basis of fraud, and the principal case was an action for damages
based on fraud. It is rather evident from the two cases, that the mis-
representations were either made with knowledge of their falsity, or in
conscious ignorance as to their truth or falsity. The one making the
false representation in each case was a real estate agent, who was or
should have been experienced in the fundamentals of house construction.
Since the facts of both cases show only a lack of knowledge of truth or
falsity, with relief being granted in one and denied in the other, the
necessary conclusion follows that the two cases are in substance
inconsistent.
It would seem that the court in the Ebbs case completely overlooked
the long line of decisions in North Carolina which support the holding
of the principal case that actual knowledge of the falsity of a misrepre-
sentation is not necessary to a finding of fraud. On the basis of the
instant case as supported by the chain of decisions, the Ebbs case (which
was never sound law) is no longer the law in North Carolina, in spite




One B died, apparently intestate. His heirs at law and next of kin
recovered all of his personal papers and turned them over to the Clerk
But in Cheek v. Southern R.R., 214 N. C. 152, 156, 198 S. E. 626, 628 (1938)
the court said, "The court has not adopted the doctrine that an unilateral mistake-
or mistake alone of the party seeking to avoid the contract-unaccompanied by
fraud, imposition, undue influence, or like circumstance of oppression, is sufficient
to avoid a contract"' It was indicated in this latter case, however, that it would
be difficult to imagine a case, in which there were innocent misrepresentations on
the one side and a mistake on the other induced by such innocent misrepresenta-
tions, that could not be resolved into mutual mistake. E.g., Vail v. Vail, 233
N. C. 109, 63 S. E. 2d 202 (1951); Breece v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 209
N. C. 527, 184 S. E. 86 (1936); Hinsdale v. W. I. Phillips Co., 199 N. C. 563,
155 S. E. 238 (1930); Bell v. Harrison, 179 N. C. 190, 102 S. E. 200 (1920);
Oltman v. Williams, 167 N. C. 312, 83 S. E. 348 (1914).
" 199 N. C. 242, 153 S. E. 858 (1930) ; Note, 9 N. C. L. REv. 86 (1930) (real
estate broker represented house to be perfectly constructed and made of stone,
when in fact, it was stone veneer; held, representations made without knowledge
of their falsity, and consequently without intent to deceive). This case was cited
in the Brief for Appellees, pp. 4, 11, Atkinson v. Charlotte Builders, Inc., 232
N. C. 67, 59 S. E. 2d 1 (1950).
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